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Abstract 
Dynamic institutional trading constraints related to capital, diversification, and short-selling 
asymmetrically affect the incorporation of new information as reflected in the permanent price 
impact of their trades. The sign of the permanent price impact asymmetry between institutional 
buys versus sells is positive at the initial stage of a price run-up and reverses due to changing 
constraints with a prolonged price run-up in a stock. Idiosyncratic volatility, analyst forecast 
dispersion, trading intensity, price dispersion, and bullish market conditions further sharpen the 
initial asymmetry, as well as its reversal after a price run-up. 
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Introduction 
         The rapidly evolving literature on institutional trading has instigated a debate over the 
direction and cause of the asymmetry in the permanent price impact of institutional buys and 
institutional sells. The permanent price impact reflects the information content of institutional 
trades, which can be an indication of the quality of the institutions’ research and their ability to 
exploit it profitably. As part of the price discovery process, new information about a stock’s 
fundamentals gets impounded into the prices when investors trade. But the degree of the price 
impact is affected by the proportion of informed trading by institutions in the market, as not all 
institutions trade on their research and information due to various constraints.  
Saar (2001) provides an intriguing theoretical model relating price history to asymmetric 
exploitation of information by institutions. The model challenges conventional wisdom about the 
positive sign of price impact asymmetry (higher price impact for institutional buys than for sells; 
see details in the literature review section) and describes the conditions under which the asymmetry 
can become negative. Normally institutions buy stocks with positive information and sell stocks 
when they have negative information. But they are not always able to implement trades because 
(a) institutions are reluctant to short sell when they do not initially hold the stock, which is true at 
the beginning of a price run-up associated with the initiation of buying activity;1 (b) institutions 
are limited in their ability to borrow to invest, and thus face a capital constraint when buying at 
the later stages of a price run-up associated with the recent buying activity; and (c) institutions 
need to diversify their investments and are reluctant to add to positions in which they already have 
significant exposure from recent buying that creates the price run-up. Given these conditions, the 
Saar model shows that the history of stock price performance asymmetrically influences how 
                                                          
1 Institutions, particularly mutual funds, are averse to short sales due to the possibility of unlimited losses on short 
positions, and regulatory constraints set forth by the SEC (Hong and Stein, 2003). 
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institutions trade to benefit from their information and analysis. Specifically, the asymmetry of the 
permanent price impact, defined as the permanent price impact of buys minus the permanent price 
impact of sells, starts out positive but diminishes with the increasing length of a price run-up. With 
an extended price run-up, institutional sells are likely unconstrained and share values are revised 
downward because of their trades. Thus, the asymmetry of price impact might even be negative if 
the price run-up history is long enough. Saar’s model further identifies the determinants of the 
asymmetry in the permanent price impact including informational variables such as idiosyncratic 
volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, trading intensity, and stock price dispersion. To the best of 
our knowledge, the results of these theoretical predictions on permanent price impact have not 
been tested empirically.  We fill this gap by empirically testing the leading theoretical model (Saar, 
2001), which highlights the importance of stock price run-up history in gauging the information 
content of institutional trades under varying constraints.   
Our paper further advances the literature on price impact asymmetry that has made much 
progress since the seminal study on block trading by Kraus and Stoll (1972). More recent works 
include Chiyachantana et al. (2004) who provides important insights on the impact of market 
condition on the price impact asymmetry. Using data for the London Stock Exchange, Bozcuk 
and Lasfer (2005) show the importance of the trade size and the ownership level that results from 
the trade. The large block trades are likely to convey private information and the level of 
institutional monitoring. Specifically, large buy (sell) trades that result in a significant increase 
(decrease) in post-trade ownership are likely to signal positive (negative) information and an 
increase (a reduction) in the degree of potential monitoring. Using Ancerno data, Anand et al. 
(2012, 2013) document significant differences in trading costs across institutions, and the 
importance of trading style for execution quality. Anand et al. (2013) propose a measure of an 
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institution’s trading style that captures the institution’s propensity to trade in the direction of the 
daily return in the stock. They show that there is important heterogeneity in institutions’ trading 
style and the implications of this heterogeneity in institutions’ participation in the post-crisis 
recovery patterns. 
We present new tests of price impact asymmetry and its determinants using a sample of 
institutions tracked by Ancerno, who collectively conducted 242 million trades worth $20 trillion 
during our sample period of 2001-2012. Our primary findings can be summarized as follows. Price 
impact asymmetry varies significantly based on the history of stock price run-up, informational 
variables, market conditions, and firm-specific characteristics. Asymmetry is positive for stocks 
that are at the initial stages of price run-ups, and turns negative when stocks have an extended 
period of run-ups. Moreover, the information content of institutional trades appears to be the 
strongest when institutions are buying at the initial stage of price run-ups or selling after a 
prolonged price run-up. These results point to constraints faced by institutions in their ability to 
trade on price-sensitive information or research. We also establish a link between institutional 
price impact asymmetry and variables that measure firms’ information environment or information 
asymmetry. For stocks with a higher degree of information asymmetry, price impact asymmetry 
is higher for shorter price run-ups. Conversely, after a long price run-up, we see a larger reduction 
in asymmetry in price impact (from positive to negative) for these stocks with a higher degree of 
information asymmetry. Proxies for information asymmetry such as idiosyncratic volatility and 
analyst forecast dispersion are important determinants of price impact in the incremental sense 
after conditioning for liquidity characteristics and contemporaneous market condition. Our work 
relates to the relationship between institutional trading activity and stock prices. Our results show 
that institutional buys are not always more informative than sells. Instead, institutional constraints 
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related to capital, diversification, and short selling affect the information content of institutional 
trades.  
To ensure that our results are robust and our net permanent price impact (NPPI) measure 
reflects the pure effects of institutional trades devoid of the effects of risk and other systematic 
factors, we employ an experimental design where we have an institutional trading treatment group 
and a no institutional trade (NIT) control group. This approach also helps rule out the possibility 
that price patterns unrelated to institutional trades drive our results.  
Our results should be of interest to a wide audience, as institutions currently hold 74% of 
stocks (Bogle, 2008), compared to 8% about 50 years ago. With a large fraction of aggregate 
wealth under their management, institutions are frequently the marginal price-setting agents in 
securities markets. Therefore, an investigation of their trading behavior and trading impact is 
necessary to understand the dynamics of stock prices. Our characterization of institutional trading 
practices, and in particular the information advantage of institutions and their ability to exploit it, 
represents an important step forward in assessing the value added by institutions under varying 
circumstances.  
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 1 presents a discussion of the 
literature and the development of the hypotheses. In Section 2, we describe the data and our 
research design. We discuss our findings and robustness tests in Section 3and conclude in Section 
4.  
1. Literature review and research hypotheses 
 We begin with the definition of price impact commonly used in the literature, with 
emphasis on the permanent price impact. Institutions usually buy (sell) large quantities of a given 
 
 
6 
 
stock and, in the process, move its price up (down). Following Kraus and Stoll (1972), total price 
impact is comprised of two parts: temporary price impact and permanent price impact. The 
temporary price impact relates to liquidity issues or widened bid-ask spread from a temporary 
imbalance in demand and supply; the temporary price impact disappears shortly after the 
completion of the trade. The permanent price impact represents any new information permanently 
impounded into the security price and the resulting price changes give rise to a new equilibrium 
price level that sustains well after the institutional trade is completed. We calculate the permanent 
price impact as the difference of the price after the completion of an institutional trade and the 
price before the arrival of the institutional order. It measures the long-lasting impact of an 
institutional trade on the stock price, and reflects the dissemination of new information into prices 
through institutional trades. The focus of our study is on the permanent price impact asymmetry 
that relates to informational issues. 
 The conventional wisdom based on studies by Kraus and Stoll (1972), Holthausen, 
Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990), Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995), Keim and Madhavan 
(1995, 1997), and Engel and Patton (2004), is that the information content of institutional buys is 
higher than that of institutional sells. These papers suggest that buys are more informative because 
the decision to buy one security out of the entire universe of available stocks is indicative of 
strongly positive private information resulting from research and analysis. In contrast, negative 
information may only be utilized for the subset of stocks already held by the institution. Short-sale 
constraints restrict institutions from freely acting on all of their pessimistic views. Moreover, when 
an institution already has a long position, liquidity needs can trigger a decision to sell.2  
                                                          
2 Liquidity-based reasons could include fund outflows, stock return exceeding the target, or availability of a better 
investment opportunity. 
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 There are relatively few exceptions to this conventional wisdom in the literature about 
institutional buys having a greater permanent price impact than sells. Studies reporting a greater 
price impact of sell orders than that of buy orders include Chiyachantana et al. (2004), Brennan et 
al. (2012), and Jondeau, Lahaye, and Rockinger (2015).  Chiyachanta et al. find that institutional 
buys have a higher total price impact in bull markets, whereas sells have a higher total price impact 
in bear markets. Brennan et al. compute buy and sell liquidity lambdas (a proxy for total price 
impact) to find that sell lambdas are greater than the buy lambdas. Jondeau, Lahaye, and Rockinger 
(2015) study 12 large capitalization stocks traded on the Euronext-Paris Bourse and find that the 
price impact is largely symmetric but the asymmetry can reverse for relatively less liquid stocks 
with a large proportion of buyer-initiated trades.  We extend this literature by focusing on 
permanent price impact and directly testing Saar’s (2001) institutional constraints theory for the 
first time using his price-run-up framework.  
 Saar (2001) predicts that the sequence of trades, information asymmetry, and recent price 
history taken together with institutional portfolio constraints can explain the permanent price 
impact asymmetry, which reflects the asymmetry in information content of institutional trades. 
Although informed traders would ideally want to use all the information from their research, in 
practice they use only some of their information due to constraints. At the beginning of a price 
run-up, institutions asymmetrically use their information. Positive information is used promptly 
and pervasively by implementing purchases, whereas the use of negative information is restricted 
due to short selling constraints. Thus, buy orders are likely based on positive information about 
the stock, while selling activities are limited only to trades from institutions that happen to hold 
the stocks in their portfolios. This increases the proportion of informed buys in the overall buying 
activity. Therefore, price impact related to the information content is expected to be higher for buy 
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orders than for sell orders, and asymmetry is positive in the early stages of a price run-up or for 
shorter run-ups.  
As positive information is released through institutional trades, more buyers are expected 
to become interested in the stock. In sequential trading, this causes a sequential increase in price 
levels in response to buy orders at the beginning of a price run-up. However, after a few days of a 
price run-up, it is likely that the positive information is largely incorporated into the price. Even if 
the institutional research indicates more potential for appreciation, buyers will limit the use of this 
information due to investment capital constraint or diversification constraint. The probability of 
an informed buy order arrival diminishes at this stage, decreasing the proportion of informed buys 
in the overall buying activity. The delay in response to the information indicates that institutional 
buying after a long price run-up may simply be herding instead of possessing any original positive 
information. Thus, prices will increase only slowly in response to buy orders after an extended 
price run-up. At this point, institutional sell orders might signal that the target price has been 
reached. Informed institutions are no longer constrained by short-sale restrictions, because they 
have more likely than not already accumulated a long position in the stock. When there is an 
institutional sale after several days of a price run-up, the market learns not only the information in 
the sale, but also that the informed buying will stop. These patterns lead us to predict a higher price 
impact from sells relative to buys after a prolonged price run-up. In essence, the asymmetry of 
permanent price impact diminishes with the duration of a price run-up due to both information 
content decay and a switch in the types of binding institutional constraints. Specifically, we test 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The asymmetry in information content reflected in the permanent price 
impact asymmetry (difference) between institutional buys versus sells is positive for a shorter price 
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run-up. After a prolonged price run-up, the asymmetry in information content or the permanent 
price impact of buys and sells becomes less positive or even negative. 
  Recognizing that the nature of information space varies across stocks, we analyze how 
the firm-specific characteristics affect the information content of institutional trades and eventually 
the price impact asymmetry. We divide Hypothesis 2 into two parts, in the first part we look at the 
measures, which are stock characteristics and in the second at measures that depend on trading in 
the market. Stocks with a lower degree of information asymmetry do not lend themselves easily 
to information-based trading. In contrast, stocks with a high degree of information asymmetry may 
offer institutions an opportunity to gain a substantial information advantage through research. The 
asymmetric price impact effects described in Hypothesis 1 will be more pronounced for stocks that 
have a higher degree of information asymmetry at the beginning of a price run-up, and the 
magnitude of the reduction in asymmetry should also be more pronounced for such stocks after a 
long price run-up. 
The literature points us to two measures of the degree of information asymmetry for 
individual stocks: idiosyncratic risk, and analyst forecast dispersion. Dierkens (1991) and Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stultz (2007) suggest that idiosyncratic risk can serve as a good proxy for the 
level of information asymmetry. Sadka and Scherbina (2007) use analyst forecast dispersion as a 
measure of information asymmetry. Analyst disagreement generally increases with earnings 
uncertainty. Hence, information asymmetry between the market maker and investors who are 
potentially better informed about future earnings will likely increase with analyst disagreement. 
To sum up: 
Hypothesis 2a: Institutional trades in stocks with a higher degree of information 
asymmetry generate a higher price impact asymmetry for a shorter price run-up, and a speedier 
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reduction in asymmetry after a prolonged price run-up relative to trades in low information 
asymmetry stocks. 
Next, we consider two additional informational variables suggested by Saar (2001): trading 
intensity and stock price dispersion. Dufour and Engle (2000) show that, for frequently traded 
stocks, the price impact of a trade is larger and converges to its full information value faster when 
subsequent trades are clustered in time (i.e., when the trading intensity is high). Thus, we seek to 
determine whether asymmetry and its reduction as described in Hypothesis 1 becomes more acute 
with an increase in trading intensity. Similarly, according to Saar (2001), higher volatility or price 
dispersion could potentially amplify the price impact patterns in Hypothesis 1, i.e. after a long 
price run-up, the reversal in the price impact asymmetry is quicker. 
Hypothesis 2b: Higher institutional trading intensity or higher price dispersion generate a 
higher price impact asymmetry for a shorter price run-up and a speedier reduction in asymmetry 
after a prolonged price run-up. 
We believe that informational variables where they be stock characteristics or market 
driven will influence the informational content in institutional trades and the manner in which it 
diffuses into prices, given the constraints. Hypothesis 2a and 2b set forth our priors. 
 
 
2. Data sources and research design 
2.1. Data 
We obtain proprietary institutional trading data from the Ancerno Corporation (formerly, 
Abel Noser). Ancerno provides consulting and advisory services to close to 1,000 domestic 
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institutional clients representing between eight to ten percent of institutional trading in the U.S. 
(Puckett and Yan, 2011) during our sample period.3 The database contains information on 
institutional orders about stock symbols, order direction (buy or sell), order quantity, value-
weighted average stock prices on and before order placement date, order release dates (from 
institutional clients to trading desks), price at the time of release, number of shares released, code 
number of broker(s) used to fill the order, transaction price, quantity of shares traded, execution 
date, and commissions charged by the broker. Institutions tracked in the Ancerno dataset 
collectively transacted over $20 trillion during our sample period of 2001-2012. We merge our 
dataset and the CRSP dataset to obtain the historic prices and returns of individual stocks 
surrounding the institutional order date so that we can classify the orders into various price run-up 
categories.4 We also obtain the analysts' current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts 
from the I/B/E/S Summary History file.  
2.2 Measures of permanent price impact 
 Due to the increase in the overall trading volume in the markets and in particular, in 
institutional order flow, several trades occur within a second. Thus, it has become difficult to study 
the price impact of individual trades in the traditional sense. In most of our data we observe both 
Buy and Sell orders for the same stock on the same day for multiple times by the same institutional 
client. In such a case, it is difficult to determine the direction of the price impact, let alone the 
asymmetry. Anand et al. (2012, 2013) adopt the idea of stitching Ancerno institutional trades into 
                                                          
3 Over time, the name of the data provider has changed. Earlier it was referred to as “Abel Noser” or “ANcerno.” 
The data source is the same as that used by Puckett and Yan (2011) and Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh (2012). 
4 To maintain the integrity of the data and filter out possible errors, we eliminate observations with missing prices or 
order quantities. In addition, following the approach of Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997) and Conrad, Johnson, and 
Wahal (2001), we exclude orders for stocks trading under $1.00. 
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an institutional ticket. Building upon this idea, we devise a new trade imbalance measure that 
considers all buy and sell trades on the same stock on a given day as well as the splitting of orders 
into small trades.  
Our measure of price impact asymmetry considers all trades of all sizes. For a given day, 
each stock, i, traded by institutional investors is assigned a direction based on whether the 
institutional trading imbalance (∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 - ∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  𝑖𝑖 ) is positive or negative 
respectively. Going forward we denote them as buy imbalance and sell imbalance. The permanent 
price impact is the change in the prices from the previous equilibrium to the new equilibrium price. 
 
Raw Permanent Price Impact, PPIt+n =  �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1
− 1� ∗ 100 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 ,                               (2)  
where Pt+n is the closing price n days after the institutional trade and Pt-1 is the closing price on the 
day before that institutional order is placed. To ensure that the change in prices are not due to bid-
ask bounce, we use mid-quotes for all our analyses.  
Direction is an indicator variable equal to +1 for buy institutional imbalance stock-days 
and −1 for sell institutional imbalance stock-days. Permanent price impact reflects the changes in 
beliefs about the value of a security due to any new information signaled by trades. Thus, a positive 
value for permanent price impact is also an indication that the trades are associated with a valuation 
update resulting from the trader’s information advantage. Our measure is similar to those used in 
studies on order flow imbalance by Hendershott, Livdan, and Schürhoff (2015) and Levi and 
Zhang (2015).                                                                                                                                
Hu (2009) raises a concern that pre and post-trade measures of price impact are influenced 
by market movements that give rise to the asymmetry. In order to alleviate such concerns and to 
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isolate the price impact related to new fundamental information about the stock and to standardize 
it across stocks with different risk characteristics, we define the market-adjusted and risk-adjusted 
permanent price impact (PPIi,t+n) for a given stock i  as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛   =  ��𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 1� − 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� ∗ 100 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷. (3)  
We decide to report results for n = 1, 5, or 10 days, respectively. The shorter 1-day 
observation period minimizes the impact of any extraneous events that can occur in the days 
following the trade. In contrast, the medium 5-day window and the longer 10-day window allow 
sufficient time for information dissemination. We compute benchmark returns in two alternative 
ways. For market return-adjusted PPI, the benchmark return is simply (MIt+n/MIt-1 −1). For beta-
adjusted PPI, the benchmark return is defined as βi * (MIt+n/MIt-1 −1), where βi is estimated using 
returns in a rolling prior 5-year window, and MIt+n and MIt-1 are CRSP value-weighted index levels 
on dates t+n and t-1, respectively.  
 
2.3 Formation of a control group to account for price patterns unrelated to institutional trades 
 We calculate price impact for various price history groups. We recognize that past returns 
and reversals may contribute to a large portion of price impact asymmetry relative to the portion 
contributed by institutional trades. To rule out this possibility, we adopt a modified price impact 
measure. For every trading day, we form a control group consisting of stocks not traded by 
institutions on that day, and the treatment group contains the stocks in our sample that were traded 
by institutions. We further divide the two groups into price run-up groups based on their prior price 
patterns. The difference between the two enables us to capture the pure price impact of institutional 
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trades that only impacts the treatment group, net of the effects of price patterns such as reversals 
that will impact both the groups. 
We now elaborate on the specific steps involved in computing the modified price impact 
measure. We begin by taking all stocks (share code 10 and 11) in the CRSP database. The control 
sample is formed each day to include the stocks that were not traded on that given day by 
institutions. Both the sample and the treatment stocks are assigned to their respective price run-up 
groups based on their price history (see detailed discussion in subsection 2.5). We then compute 
the price impact for both groups in these price run-up categories. The price change for the control 
group is computed in a manner similar to that of the benchmark PPI for treatment stocks. Note that 
the market adjustment drops out when we take the difference between the groups because the 
market adjustment is the same quantity for both groups. The NIT (no institutional trade) adjusted 
price impact (NPPI) is thus defined as: 
          NIT-adjusted PPI (NPPIt+n) = Treatment PPIt+n – Control PPIt+n.                  (4) 
 
2.4. Trade size and permanent price impact 
The price impact calculated for individual stock-days in the previous subsection must be 
aggregated and averaged within each price run-up group for further analysis. In this step, we want 
to rule out the possibility that any differences in the transaction sizes of buys and sells 
systematically affects our results. Thus, we calculate the net trade flow- weighted permanent price 
impact for each price history group g at t+n, PPI(g)t+n, as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑔𝑔)𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 . (5) 
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Here SVi is the net imbalance for a given stock i, and it is summed over all stock days in a 
given group. The weighting scheme is applied to raw PPI, market-adjusted PPI, beta-adjusted 
PPI, and control group adjusted PPI (NPPI). Throughout the paper, we report this net imbalance 
weighted average permanent price impact.5  
The price impact asymmetry (PIA) for each price group is defined as the difference between 
the permanent price impact of purchases and that of sells: 
 
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 (𝑔𝑔)𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 =  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑔𝑔)𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 −  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑔𝑔)𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠. (6) 
          Price impact asymmetry is positive when the price impact of buys is greater than that of 
sells, and negative otherwise. 
 
2.5 Defining price run-up and forming price run-up groups  
Our analysis requires us to carefully define a price run-up as this is critical to our empirical 
design. Price run-up is defined as the number of days of consecutive positive market-adjusted 
returns in the stock just prior to the arrival of institutional orders.  We search through the CRSP 
database to classify each calendar trading day into a price history group, which is based on the 
number of consecutive days that a stock experiences positive excess returns over the market before 
the trend stops or reverses. To rule out the possibility that different closing prices of a stock simply 
reflect bid-ask bounce, we use a stricter criterion, which requires the absolute return to exceed a 
                                                          
5 In our robustness section, instead of using SV as weights, we use net dollar volume (DV) as weights to compute the 
dollar size-weighted price impact, average transaction volumes (TV) as weights to compute the trade size-weighted 
price impact, and 1/m as weights to compute the conventional equal-weighted price impact. Our results are not 
sensitive to the choice of weights. 
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transaction cost band of six cents, which approximately represents the average bid-ask spread in 
the post decimalization period and represents the tick size in the first few months of our sample. 
Thus, if the stock price on day t is within the six-cent range of the price on day t-1, we assume that 
there is no run-up on day t because the observed price change may merely be the bid-ask bounce. 
Excluding stock-days falling in the zero-return category, we have 2.87 million stock-days with 
price run-ups, as compared to 3.32 million stock days of price run-ups without the adjustment of 
transaction costs, a reduction of 16% in sample size.   
We form three distinct price history groups:  1-day price run-up (+1), 2-5-day price run-
ups (+2 to +5), and 6-10-day price run-ups (+6 to +10), respectively. The choice of +1, +2 to +5, 
and +6 to +10 is based on data distribution. The number of stock-days with more than 10 days of 
price run-up are too few to conduct any meaningful analysis. The longest price run-up days in our 
data is 18 days and only 1 stock day falls in that group. The percentage of the sample with price 
run-ups greater than 10 days is less than 0.04%, thus we decided to choose 10-day run-up as a 
reasonable cutoff. The choice of 1 and 2 to 5 is driven by creating two comparable sets of stock 
days, each exceeding 1 million observations (i.e., 1.7 million and 1.1 million, respectively). The 
choice of 6 to 10 in the remaining sample allows us to have a significant number of observations 
in the group, around 36,000, so that the categories are representative and meaningful. 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for sample firms, explanatory variables, and 
control firms. We have 4,705 securities in our final sample, as noted in Panel A; their average 
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market capitalization is $3.15 billion, as shown in Panel C. The average volume-weighted trade 
price is $32.62, and the average daily trading volume per stock is 3.95 million shares.  
Our sample comprises 242 million institutional trades of all sizes. After aggregating stocks 
based on net institutional imbalances, we have 7.2 million stock-days. Of these, 2.87 million 
represent price run-up days and the rest are run-downs or no change. Each stock-day is categorized 
as having either net institutional buy imbalance or net institutional sell imbalance, based on 
whether the institutional trading imbalance (∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 - ∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  𝑖𝑖 ) is positive or 
negative. Overall, there are 3.91 million stock-days that institutions have a buy imbalance, 
compared to 3.29 million stock-days with a sell imbalance. On a given day, we have an average of 
801 stocks being traded in our sample that witnessed price run-ups.  
We use two proxies of information asymmetry for each individual stock: idiosyncratic 
volatility and analyst forecast dispersion. We define idiosyncratic volatility as the standard 
deviation of the regression residual from the Fama-French three-factor model for each stock each 
month; its mean is 11.78%. The mean analyst forecast dispersion, defined as the standard deviation 
of analysts' current fiscal year annual earnings per share forecasts scaled by the share price, is 
8.97%. Trading intensity, defined as a stock’s total monthly trading volume divided by its total 
number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year, averages at 2.02 times. Following Lee, 
Ready, and Seguin (1994), we calculate stock price dispersion as the percentage difference in the 
highest and the lowest closing prices in the 90 calendar days prior to an institutional order. Mean 
price dispersion is 37.81%. All the above variables are available at monthly frequencies. We 
calculate idiosyncratic volatility on a rolling window with the latest five years of data. The analyst 
forecast dispersion is calculated every month, with information of the most recent 12 months of 
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forecasts, and the price dispersion is calculated monthly from price information of the most recent 
90 days. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the stocks that form part of the control group. There are on 
average 692 stocks in the control group on a given day, with an average market capitalization of 
$2.23 billion.  The volume-weighted stock price of the control group is $22.10, which implies that 
it is not comprised of low-priced, illiquid stocks and is comparable to that of the treatment group. 
The market capitalization and daily trading volume are also close for the two groups. Hence, we 
believe that the NIT-adjusted measure of price impact will properly control for most market-wide 
changes and any short term price trends unrelated to institutional trading. To further ensure that 
our groups are similar prior to institutional trading, we compare the pre-return performance of the 
control group with Ancerno stocks. In results reported in Panel D, we find that the pre-return 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are similar for the two groups and the differences between the 
CARs for the two groups over prior 1-, 5- and 10-day windows is not significantly different at the 
5% level. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2. Price impact asymmetry  
Our measure of permanent price impact is based on institutional trading imbalance and 
captures the overall pressure that institutional investors exert on the market. Because our measure 
differs from prior studies, we first show that the results are consistent with those reported in the 
literature on price impact asymmetry. In Table 2, we report three different measures of permanent 
price impact for 1, 5, and 10 days after the trade date. We find that the permanent price impact 
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asymmetry is positive for all three measures and the asymmetry increases as we move from 1 day 
to 10 days ahead. For the raw permanent price impact measured after 1 day of trades we find the 
asymmetry to be 0.18 bps, which increases to 1.25 bps for the permanent price impact asymmetry 
measured after 10 trading days. Our market-adjusted and risk-adjusted results are 0.14 bps and 
0.08 bps for the 1-day price impact asymmetry, and 0.90 bps and 0.71 bps for the 10-day price 
impact asymmetry, respectively. Overall, our measure of PPI yields estimates that are consistent 
with what has been reported in the literature for example Keim and Madhavan (1996) and Kraus 
and Stoll (1972) report positive price impact asymmetry of around 0.10 %.   
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3.3. Price impact asymmetry and past price movement  
 We next test Hypothesis 1 on how institutional constraints captured in price run-up history 
affect price impact asymmetry (Saar, 2001). Although we test directly, the precise relations 
between asymmetry and price-run predicted by Saar (2001) in this paper, we also verify Saar’s 
assumption that price-run ups are indeed associated with institutional constraints6 in our Online 
Appendix. 
With the price history group carefully defined, we first present the raw permanent price 
impact for each price history group in Panel A of Table 3 using the three different post-trade price 
                                                          
6 Specifically, following the method in Chakrabarty, Moulton, and Trzcinka (2017) to construct holdings, we 
confirm that institutions buy more at the initial stages of a price run-up when their holding in the stock is still low 
and they face short-selling constraints. In contrast, the sell imbalances are the highest after a long price run-up when 
institutions face capital constraints and diversification constraints because they already have a sizable holding in the 
stock. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
 
 
20 
 
benchmarks (t+1, t+5, and t+10). For each of the three post-trade price benchmarks, we calculate 
price impact of buys, the price impact of sells, and the asymmetry between those two.  
For raw PPIt+1 in Panel A, the price impact of buy (sell) orders is a decreasing (increasing) 
function of the length of a price run-up. Buy orders arriving during the early stages of a price run-
up experience a higher permanent price impact than those arriving at later stages of the run-up. 
The price impact is 89 bps with a 1-day run-up and drops to 77 bps with +2 to +5 days of run-up. 
After a prolonged run-up of 6-10 days, the price impact of buys drops further to 27 bps. The 
monotonic decline in the price impact of buys is consistent with the notion that it becomes more 
difficult for institutional investors with information to buy as the capital and diversification 
constraints become more binding as we move from the early to the later stages of a price run-up. 
With a longer price run-up, buy imbalances are less informed and could represent herding behavior 
instead of information. 
The pattern of the permanent price impact of sells is opposite to that of buys. Consistent 
with the arguments in Hypothesis 1, the price impact of sells increases with the length of the price 
run-up. This is because as institutions accumulate inventory in the presence of a price run-up, the 
short-selling constraints that institutional investors initially faced becomes less binding. The price 
impact is 32 bps after a 1-day price run-up and it increases to 90 bps for sells in stocks with 6-10 
days of consecutive price increases.  This is an indication that informed institutional selling is less 
constrained after a long price run-up and generates a larger permanent price impact.  
 We synthesize the results for buys and sells by reporting the price impact asymmetry, 
which is positive for stocks that are at the earlier stages of a price run-up. As the length of a price 
run-up increases, the price impact of sells increases substantially while the price impact of buys 
decreases substantially. Thus, the price impact asymmetry becomes negative after a prolonged 
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price run-up. The last row of Panel A, reports statistical significance tests for the difference 
between the price impact asymmetry of the last group (+6 to +10) and the first group (+1). The 
difference between the two is -120 bps and is statistically significant at the 5% level, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The relation between the market-adjusted permanent price impact of buys and sells, and 
the asymmetry between buys and sells conditioned on price history, is plotted in Figure 1. It 
displays the reduction in asymmetry in price impact with the increase in the price run-ups. At the 
beginning of a price run-up, the market-adjusted price impact is 89 bps for buys and 51 bps for 
sells. But after ten days of price run-up, the difference flips, with buys having a price impact of 35 
bps compared to 105 bps for sells. For the price history ranging from +1 day to +10 days, we see 
a clear trend that the price impact of buys (sells) declines (increases) as the streak of consecutive 
positive price changes increases from +1 day to +10 days.  
At the beginning of a price run-up, the conventional wisdom of Chan and Lakonishok 
(1993) and Keim and Madhavan (1995) applies; they suggest that price impact is mainly a function 
of the direction of trades, and that asymmetry is always positive. However, our novel empirical 
finding is consistent with the model of Saar (2001) that price history matters, and with long enough 
price run-ups, price impact asymmetry is generally negative. Thus, the information content of 
institutional trades can only be assessed after understanding institutional trading behavior and 
constraints. One can clearly see that between +3 and +4 of the price run-ups that the price impact 
for buy imbalances becomes less than the price impact for sell imbalances and keeps decreasing.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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We also examine Hypothesis 1 with alternate post-trade windows of either 5 or 10 days. 
The direction and significance of the results are generally consistent across all three windows. In 
Panels B and C of Table 3, we report market-adjusted and beta-adjusted permanent price impact, 
respectively. Our results are qualitatively similar to what we report in Panel A of Table 3.  
Lastly, we report NPPI (no institutional trade-adjusted net permanent price impact) 
specified in equation 4 in Panel D of Table 3. Our no institutional trade-adjusted measure of price 
impact removes the effects of price reversal that may be unrelated to institutional trading by 
deducting the corresponding no-trade price changes from the raw PPI. These are control stocks 
that have undergone similar price patterns (witnessed the same number of days of price run-up as 
the treatment sample), but were not traded by institutional investors in our sample. Thus, we are 
able to extract the pure effects of institutional trading. We continue to find price impact asymmetry 
results consistent with Hypothesis 1. Thus, our findings of changing price impacts and the resulting 
asymmetry for different price history groups are consistent with the notion that institutions are 
asymmetrically constrained in exploiting their information during the course of a price run-up. 
Since NPPI can best isolate the pure permanent price impact of institutional trades by removing 
price changes unrelated to institutional trading, we use NPPI in the remainder of our analyses.   
In addition to the results reported in Figure 1 and Table 3, we also attempt to quantify the 
economic significance of our results. It is clear from some basic calculations of institutional dollar 
turnover presented in the Online Appendix that the asymmetry is not only statistically significant, 
it also has a profound impact on market valuation.7   
                                                          
7 As a quick summary of the Online Appendix, buy trades move the prices up by 0.89% (taken from Table 3, Panel A), 
which represents an upward revision in value of $43.32 million in total based on 186,318 shares bought on stock days 
with buy imbalances. The sells averaging 53,124 shares on such days move prices down 0.32%, which represents a 
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3.4. Price impact asymmetry and informational variables 
We demonstrate the importance of informational variables such as idiosyncratic stock 
volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, trading intensity, and stock price dispersion in Table 4. Our 
general approach is to form high and low information asymmetry portfolios using the 4th and the 
1st quartiles, respectively. The results are robust when using medians instead of quartiles as cut-
offs for forming groups based on information asymmetry (not tabulated here but available upon 
request). We also conduct multivariate regression analysis (reported in Table 6) using the actual 
values of these variables for each stock-day.  
3.4.1. Price impact asymmetry and idiosyncratic volatility  
Panel A1 of Table 4 reports price impact asymmetry based on idiosyncratic volatility 
(IVOL) and price history. First, price impact asymmetry monotonically decreases as a price run-
up becomes longer for both the high and low IVOL groups, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1 
that after a prolonged price run-up, the price impact asymmetry between buys and sells becomes 
less positive or even negative. Second, the price impact asymmetry is higher for high IVOL stocks 
than for low IVOL stocks. A closer look at the price impact conditioned on price history also shows 
that the higher price impacts of informed buys after an initial price run-up and that of sells after an 
extended price run-up are the main drivers for the price impact asymmetry patterns. Both these 
findings are consistent with Saar’s (2001) model and Hypothesis 2a. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                          
downward revision of valuation at $4.44 million. This pattern completely flips after a long price run-up. The asymmetric 
permanent price impact response suggests that Ancerno institutions’ trades have changed the valuation of the traded 
stocks very differently depending on whether they are buying or selling. 
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3.4.2. Price impact asymmetry and analyst forecast dispersion 
 The dispersion among analysts about forecasted earnings is larger when information is 
heterogeneous or unevenly distributed. Thus, disagreement among analysts is an indication of a 
lack of publicly available information and can be used to form a metric of the degree of information 
asymmetry about a firm’s prospects.8 We define analyst forecast dispersion as the standard 
deviation of the earnings forecast scaled by the share price. We form our portfolios of high and 
low information asymmetry groups using observations in the 4th and the 1st quartiles. 
Results on the relation between permanent price impact asymmetry, analyst forecast 
dispersion, and price history are reported in Panel B of Table 4. We see strong support for Saar’s 
(2001) hypothesis that asymmetry is more severe for stocks with high analyst forecast dispersions 
for shorter price run-ups. Likewise, the reduction in asymmetry is indeed much stronger for the 
high analyst forecast dispersion group than for the low analyst forecast dispersion group after 
prolonged price run-ups. Within each subgroup based on the dispersion of analyst forecasts, we 
continue to observe the highest information content in institutional buys (sells) after a 1-day price 
run-up (+6 to +10 days of run-ups). For instance, sells after 6-10 days of run-ups have PPI of 117 
bps for stocks with higher forecast dispersions, versus only 95 bps for stocks with lower forecast 
dispersions. 
The difference between the asymmetry after 6-10 days of price run-ups and the asymmetry 
after 1-day of price run-ups shows a reduction in the buy price impact and an increase in the sell 
                                                          
8 Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996) show that analyst forecast dispersion decreases as firms enhance information 
disclosure. Dispersions also decrease when analysts have access to conference calls (Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto, 
2002) and better access to management (Chen and Matsumoto, 2006). 
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price impact and is consistent with the hypothesized reduction in asymmetry. Also, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2a, the reduction in asymmetry is more pronounced at –157 bps for high analyst 
forecast dispersion stocks than the -78 bps for low analyst forecast dispersion stocks using the t+1 
post-trade price benchmark. The direction is similar and the magnitude is stronger for other post-
trade observation windows of t+5 and t+10 (not tabulated for brevity). 
 
3.4.3. Price impact asymmetry and trading intensity 
In Panel C of Table 4, we examine institutional trading intensity. For the shorter run-ups 
of 1 day or 2 to 5 days, we see that the price impact asymmetry is higher for stocks with high 
trading intensity. However, as a price run-up increases to 6 to 10 days, we see the asymmetry 
decline at a much faster rate for stocks with more intensive institutional trading, as predicted by 
Saar (2001). Taken together, these results provide support to Saar’s theory and Hypothesis 2b. The 
difference row represents the reduction in price impact asymmetry. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b 
the difference in asymmetry between a long and a short price run-up is more extreme at -80 bps 
for high intensity stocks than the -17 bps for low intensity stocks using the t+1 post-trade price 
benchmark.  
 
 
3.4.4. Price impact asymmetry and stock price dispersion 
 In Hypothesis 2b, we also posit that price impact asymmetry is higher for stocks with higher 
price dispersion at earlier stages of price run-ups, whereas this pattern is expected to be the 
opposite when stocks have extended price run-ups. The results reported in Panel D of Table 4 are 
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consistent with the hypothesis. Initially, at the beginning of price run-ups, price impact asymmetry 
is larger for high price dispersion stocks (163 bps) than for low price dispersion stocks (0 bps). 
The reduction in the price impact asymmetry between 6-10 days of run-up and 1 day of run-up is 
more pronounced at -204 bps for stocks with high price dispersion than -8 bps for stocks with low 
price dispersion. 
 
3.5. Price impact asymmetry and market condition 
  Our sample period from 2001 to 2012 contains both bull and bear periods. Chiyachantana 
et al. (2004) show that market conditions are important drivers of buy-sell asymmetry. Thus, 
before we perform our multivariate regression of the determinants of the price impact 
asymmetry, we perform a test to see if the documented pattern of asymmetry holds under 
different market conditions.   We capture market condition with the monthly CRSP value-
weighted index return, where a bull market is a month when the CRSP value-weighted index 
provided positive returns and the bear market is when the CRSP value-weighted index had 
negative returns. In general, price impact is expected to be amplified when the trades are in the 
direction of the market movement (i.e., buys in bull markets and sells in bear markets) and 
subdued when trades are in the opposite direction. We report our results in Table 5. As expected, 
our results are highly robust to market conditions. Market conditions do play a role in the sense 
that for any level of price run-up, buy price impact in bull markets is higher than buy price 
impact in bear markets; similarly, the sell price impact is generally higher in bear markets. But 
the reversal of the asymmetry with price-run up holds in both bull and bear markets. Thus, we 
can conclude that the institutional constraints in Saar (2001) theory are at play in both bull and 
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bear markets and have significant incremental power in explaining price impact asymmetry over 
and above that caused by market conditions. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
3.6. Multivariate regression of permanent price impact 
Finally, we examine the determinants of price impact on both a stand-alone basis and 
interactive basis, in a multivariate regression for institutional trades. We use a dummy variable 
Buy which equals 1 for all stock-days with buy imbalances and 0 for all stock-days with sell 
imbalances. The regression equation is: 
        
 
𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽2  𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉 𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 +
𝛽𝛽4  (𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉 𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵) + 𝛽𝛽5  (𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷) +
𝛽𝛽6 (𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉 𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵) + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 +
𝛽𝛽8 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉 + et.                                                   (7) 
 
Where the dependent variable NPPI is the adjusted permanent price impact of the 
institutional trade defined in equation 4, and Price History is the number of days that a stock has 
experienced positive excess return. Because Analyst forecast dispersion has been widely used as 
a direct measure of the information asymmetry, and plays a significant role in our univariate 
analysis, we choose to include it in our multivariate analysis to represent the intensity of 
information asymmetry. Our results hold with other information asymmetry proxies (idiosyncratic 
volatility, trading intensity, and price dispersion) as well, but are not tabulated for brevity.   
Our multivariate analysis involves building the model stepwise. In line with conventional 
wisdom, the regressions specification includes the buy imbalance dummy, Buy, which is expected 
to be positive. Next, Price History helps build the test of Saar’s theory. The variable of interest is 
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the interaction term between Buy and Price History, which allows us to explicitly test Hypothesis 
1 of declining price impact asymmetry with an increase in price run-up. The results reported in 
Table 6 (column labeled as Hypothesis 1) first confirm that stocks with buy imbalance generally 
have a higher price impact in line with the conventional wisdom. But more importantly, this Buy 
effect is weakened when there is a long Price History of run-ups, as the coefficient for the 
interaction term is negative -0.110 and is highly significant. This is consistent with the Hypothesis 
1 as the asymmetry of price impact shifts from highly positive to less positive or even negative 
when there is a long price run-up.  
We proceed to test Hypothesis 2 by adding Analyst Dispersion, the two-way interaction of 
Buy and Analyst Dispersion, and the three-way interaction among Buy, Price History and Analyst 
Dispersion. We report results in the column 2.  As expected, the coefficient for the interaction 
between Buy and Price History remains negative and significant per Hypothesis 1. Additionally, 
we find, a higher degree of Information Asymmetry is associated with a higher price impact and 
that effect is stronger when interacted with the Buy dummy, consistent with Hypothesis 2. The 
three-way interaction coefficient is negative, suggesting that the asymmetry in stocks with a higher 
degree of information asymmetry will see a reversal when the there is a long price run-up. While 
the direction is consistent with Hypothesis 2, this effect is not significant in this baseline model.  
To ensure that our model estimates do not suffer from bias due to omitted variables, we add control 
variables such as Market Condition, Firm Size and Inverse Stock Price that are known to be 
important determinants of the asymmetry.  Following Chiyachantana et al. (2004), we measure 
market condition with the monthly CRSP value-weighted index return. We expect to see that price 
impact asymmetry to be amplified when the trades are in the direction of the market movement 
(i.e., buys in bull markets and sells in bear markets) and subdued when trades are in the opposite 
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direction. In addition, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1997) show that 
institutional price impact is negatively correlated with a stock’s market capitalization, and 
positively correlated with relative price, so we include all these factors as control variables in our 
analysis. We report results from our full model specification in column 3.  
We continue to see that the interaction between Buy and Price History is negative and 
significant.  The negative coefficient implies that the longer the price run-up, the lower the 
asymmetry, which is what Saar (2001) predicts would happen when informed institutions face 
dynamic constraints.  Once proper control variables are included in the model, the coefficient for 
the three-way interaction is negative and significant, suggesting that the asymmetry in stocks with 
a higher degree of information asymmetry will see a reversal when the there is a long price run-
up, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Thus, taken together, our results offer strong support to both 
hypotheses on price impact asymmetry stemmed from the theoretical model of Saar (2001).  
We also run the regression with NPPI for t+5 and t+10 days with the same set of 
independent variables in columns 4 and 4 respectively and find that the main result remains robust 
when permanent price impact is measured at these points after the institutional trades. We find that 
the asymmetry is larger at the initial stage of a price run-up, and the reduction in asymmetry is also 
more pronounced after a long price run-up. However, the effects of analyst dispersion in 
sharpening the asymmetry is not statistically significant at these longer horizons.    
The coefficients on control variables are consistent with prior research. The 
contemporaneous market condition variable has a statistically significant positive coefficient, 
implying that price impact asymmetry is positive in bull markets and negative in bear markets. 
Price impact is not significantly affected by market capitalization, but negatively affected by the 
inverse of stock price.  
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 [Insert Table 6 about here]  
 
3.7. Robustness tests 
In this subsection, we show that our inferences about the information content of 
institutional trades are robust to a variety of alternative definitions for price run-ups, and price 
impacts. We also discuss several alternative explanations of our findings.  
 3.7.1. Price impact asymmetry on event days  
 Net trading volume might include a number of non-event days (trading days without 
meaningful institutional volume). To further examine how price impact asymmetry relates to 
price history and constraints on event days, we identify abnormal net volume event days.9 We 
compute the average net volume for each stock based on its trades in the previous 60 trading 
days on a rolling basis. We define an event day as an abnormal volume stock-day where the 
absolute net trade volume exceeds the average. This gives us 1.4 million abnormal institutional 
trading activity stock days. We then compute the NPPI net buy and net sell stock-days given 
their price run-up history. We report the results for this sub-sample in panel A of Table 7.  Our 
results remain robust for this sample of event days. We also compute event days based on 
abnormal CRSP volume. We classify days on which stocks traded (by the entire market) more 
than the average of the last 60 trading days as event days. We have 0.97 million such event 
days. The results reported in Panel B of Table 7 are still consistent with the results for the entire 
sample. 
                                                          
9 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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[Insert Table 7 about here]  
3.7.2. Orders executed on the same day  
Although 86% of our sample orders are executed on the same day, the rest take multiple 
days to execute. We expect that our daily trade imbalance measures are not affected by the length 
of order execution. Nonetheless, as a robustness test, we exclude all orders that are executed over 
multiple days. The conclusions about asymmetry and its reduction with price run-up remain the 
same. For example, NPPI asymmetry for a 1-day run-up is 67 bps when our sample is restricted to 
trades completed within a single day compared to 60 bps for all orders in Panel D of Table 3 and 
the reversal for t+1 is -59 bps for this sample compared to -82 bps in Table 3. Results are not 
reported for brevity but available from the Online Appendix.   
   
3.7.3. Alternative explanations\ 
Our results are driven by the asymmetric use of positive and negative information by 
institutions. However, alternative explanations may be plausible for the results we find. For 
example, prior works suggest that the decrease in total price impact (sum of temporary and 
permanent price impacts) of buy trades could be due to portfolio rebalancing (Calvet, Campbell, 
and Sodini, 2009) or disposition effect (Frazzini, 2006). Portfolio rebalancing refers to institutions’ 
periodic rebalancing by selling winners. The disposition effect refers to the tendency of investors 
to sell stocks whose prices have increased. Both are relatively mechanical decisions, unlike the 
informed institutional trading and related constraints explored in Saar’s (2001) model of price run-
up.  Because rebalancing and disposition sells are not information related, they may only lead to a 
temporary price impact but not permanent price impact as we have reported. The permanent price 
impact of sells isolate and rule out the alternative explanations and indicates unconstrained use of 
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negative information by institutions, when no longer constrained by short selling constraints 
because a stock is now held in institutions’ portfolios. Furthermore, Barberis and Xiong (2009) 
that characterize the disposition effect as “[o]ne of the most robust facts about the trading of 
individual investors,” not institutional traders.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Using a comprehensive dataset from Ancerno for the 2001-2012 period, we extend the 
literature on price impact asymmetry by scrutinizing the effects of individual stock price history 
on the information content of institutional trades. This is the first empirical test of Saar’s (2001) 
theoretical model concerning the asymmetric use of information by institutional traders under 
changing constraints – namely, capital, diversification, and short selling constraints –  at different 
stages of price run-ups. By focusing on total imbalances, we are able to capture the reality of 
institutional order splitting in the current market structure. We also adjust our measures for the 
return patterns related to price history but unrelated to institutional trades (our no institutional trade 
control sample) to rule out the alternative explanation that asymmetry is due to return reversals. 
We find that price impact asymmetry is a function of the history of stock prices as well as the 
informational characteristics of stocks, and market condition. Price impact asymmetry in stocks at 
earlier stages of price run-ups is generally positive. After prolonged price run-ups, permanent price 
impact asymmetry reverses and ultimately becomes negative. Our results are consistent with the 
notion that the asymmetry of permanent price impact directly depends on changing institutional 
constraints. During the initial stages of a price run-up, the short-selling constraint is binding but 
not the capital and diversification constraints. As the duration of a price run-up becomes longer, 
the capital and diversification constraints are more likely to bind and institutions are less likely to 
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face the short-selling constraint. In addition, price impact asymmetry is affected by informational 
variables, such as idiosyncratic volatility, analyst forecast dispersions, trading intensity, and price 
dispersions. Stocks with higher information asymmetry also experience a larger reduction in the 
price impact asymmetry after prolonged price run-ups.  
Our findings suggest that institutional trading performance, which eventually impacts 
portfolio return performance, can be significantly affected by the direction and the timing of trades 
in relation to the price history and informational characteristics of individual stocks. Our analysis 
of the permanent price impact of institutional trading suggests that institutions are in fact informed, 
and their trades update the valuation of traded stocks. Our findings help us gain a better 
understanding of how prices respond to information and institutions’ ability to trade on that 
information.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
We report summary statistics for all institutional trades in the Ancerno dataset for the 2001 to 2012 period. 
Panel A provides an overview. Panel B has the summary of explanatory variables. Idiosyncratic volatility is 
estimated monthly, as mean squared errors from the regression of excess daily returns of each stock on the 
Fama-French three factors Analyst forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts' current-fiscal-
year annual earnings per share forecasts divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast, as reported in 
the I/B/E/S Summary History file. Trading intensity is the monthly trading volume in a stock divided by the 
number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. Price dispersion is the percentage difference 
between the highest and the lowest trading prices in the 90 calendar days just prior to the institutional trade. 
Panels C and D show characteristics of institutional trades in Ancerno and the No Institutional Trade (NIT) 
Control group, which consists of stocks not traded by Ancerno institutions on a given day.  We define price 
run-up history as the number of days of consecutive positive market adjusted returns in the stock prior to 
the arrival of the institutional trade. We calculate t-statistics using standard errors adjusted with the Newey-
West (1987) procedure and reported in parentheses.  
Panel A: Sample Characteristics 
Number of Securities 4,705  
Total Number of Trades (million) 242  
Total Number of Stock days (million) 7.20  
Number of Stock Days with Buy Imbalance (million) 3.91  
Number of Stock Days with Sell Imbalance (million) 3.29 
 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Explanatory variables  
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (%) 11.78 5.34 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion (%) 8.97 13.21 
Trading Intensity  2.02 1.49 
Price Dispersion (%) 37.81 27.16 
   
Panel C: Ancerno Institutional Trading Sample and No Institutional Trade (NIT) Control Sample 
  Ancerno Institutional NIT Control 
Average Securities Traded Every Day  801 692 
Average Market Capitalization (billion $)  3.15 2.23 
Volume Weighted Share Price ($)  32.62 22.10 
Average Daily Volume (million)  3.95 2.08 
Panel D: Pre-Return comparison of Ancerno and Control Sample 
Price Run-
Up 
History 
CAR (1 day prior) CAR (5 days prior) CAR (10 days prior) 
 Ancerno  NIT  Diff. Ancerno NIT  Diff. Ancerno NIT  Diff. 
          
1 -0.95 -1.11 0.16 -0.87 -0.84 -0.03 -0.67 -0.48 -0.20 
   (1.44)   (-0.42)   (-1.31) 
+2 to +5  -0.98 -1.18 0.19 -0.95 -0.98 0.03 -0.82 0.40 -1.21 
   (1.27)   (0.39)   (-1.26) 
+6 to +10  -0.95 -1.13 0.17 -1.14 -2.16 1.02 -1.14 -1.59 0.44 
   (1.60)   (1.73)   (0.46) 
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Table 2. Positive price impact asymmetry  
We calculate the permanent price impact (PPI) of institutional trades, and the asymmetry in several ways.  
Raw Permanent Price Impact of Institutional Trades,  PPI t+n-=    �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1
− 1� ∗ 100 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷  
Market Adjusted Permanent Price Impact of Institutional Trades,  MPPI t+n= ��𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1
− 1� − (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
− 1)� ∗ 100 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 
Beta Adjusted Permanent Price Impact of Institutional Trades, BPPI t+n=  ��𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1
− 1� − 𝛽𝛽 ∗ (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
− 1)� ∗ 100 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷. All stocks traded by 
institutions on a day are classified as having an institutional buy or sell imbalance based on whether the institutional trading imbalance (∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 - 
∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  𝑖𝑖 ) is positive (Direction=+1) or negative (Direction=-1) respectively. The subscript t denotes the trade date when the trade is executed; 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 denote prices on dates t+n and CRSP value weighted index levels on dates t+n respectively. We report results over three windows with 
values of n being 1, 5, and 10 days after the trade date. β is the rolling beta estimated from the Fama-French three-factor model using monthly return data 
over 5 years from CRSP. Price impact is averaged across stock days and weighted using the institutional imbalance. We define price impact asymmetry 
(PIA) as the difference between the permanent price impact of buy and that of sell. We divide the sample into three groups based on past price run-up of 
1 day, 2-5 days, or 6-10 days. Price history is the number of days of consecutive positive market-adjusted returns or run-up prior to the institutional trading 
order. Price impact is averaged across orders within each group, and weighted by institutional trading imbalance.  We calculate t-statistics using standard 
errors adjusted with the Newey-West (1987) procedure and reported in parentheses.  The number of stock-day observations is 7,200,225 
 PPI t+1   PPI t+5   PPI t+10 
 Buy Sell Asymmetry   Buy Sell Asymmetry   Buy Sell Asymmetry 
 PPI 0.78 0.60 0.18  1.02 0.23 0.78  1.28 0.03 1.25 
   (2.70)    (8.78)    (7.93) 
            
 MPPI 0.79 0.64 0.14  0.94 0.39 0.55  1.11 0.21 0.90 
   (2.18)    (6.41)    (5.86)  
           
 BPPI 0.77 0.69 0.08  0.88 0.43 0.45  0.98 0.27 0.71 
   (1.29)    (5.15)    (4.63) 
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Table 3. The reduction of price impact asymmetry 
The Table shows the permanent price impact asymmetry based on past price run-up of 1 day, 2-5 days, or 6-10 days. We report results with three values of 
n to measure PPI 1, 5, and 10 days after institutional trade imbalance. We average price impact across stock days for each group, and weighted by 
institutional trading imbalance. Asymmetry for each price history group is defined as the difference between the permanent price impacts of buy imbalances 
and sell imbalances. The net institutional trade price impact, NPPI = Raw Permanent Price Impact –Control PPI. On a given day, stocks not traded by 
institutional investors become part of the control set and we calculate their price Impact. NPPI is the price impact of stocks traded minus the average price 
impact of stocks not traded.  We calculate t-statistics using standard errors adjusted with the Newey-West (1987) procedure.   *, ** indicate significance at 
1% and 5% levels. The number of stock-day observations is 2,869,304. 
Price Run-Up History 
PPI t+1   PPI t+5   PPI t+10 
Buy Sell Asymmetry   Buy Sell Asymmetry   Buy Sell Asymmetry 
Panel A: PPI 
1 0.89 0.32 0.57*  0.93 0.23 0.71*  1.19 0.17 1.02* 
+2 to +5  0.77 0.60 0.18**  0.83 0.41 0.41**  0.92 0.48 0.43 
+6 to +10  0.27 0.90 -0.63*  0.37 0.88 -0.51**  0.45 1.02 -0.76** 
Magnitude of Reduction (+6 to +10 minus +1) -1.20*    -1.21*    -1.78*  
  (4.58)    (4.29)    (3.86) 
Panel B: MPPI       
1 0.88 0.45 0.43*  0.86 0.39 0.46*  0.95 0.19 0.75* 
+2 to +5  0.76 0.69 0.09  0.77 0.47 0.29  0.77 0.61 0.16 
+6 to +10  0.31 0.98 -0.67**  0.20 1.01 -0.81**  0.34 1.31 -0.96** 
Magnitude of Reduction (+6 to +10 minus +1) -1.11*    -1.27*    -1.72*  
  (3.29)    (3.45)    (3.23) 
Panel C: BPPI       
1 0.86 0.48 0.38*  0.79 0.44 0.34**  0.80 0.28 0.52** 
+2 to +5  0.76 0.70 0.05  0.80 0.51 0.29  0.75 0.66 0.09 
+6 to +10  0.38 0.93 -0.56**  0.17 1.13 -0.95**  0.23 1.44 -1.22** 
Magnitude of Reduction (+6 to +10 minus +1) -0.94*    -1.30*    -1.73*  
  (3.80)    (3.20)    (3.13) 
Panel D NPPI      
1 0.95 0.35 0.60*  0.97 0.26 0.71*  1.22 0.14 1.09* 
+2 to +5  0.90 0.51 0.40*  1.02 0.20 0.82*  1.15 0.19 0.96* 
+6 to +10  0.56 0.78 -0.22  0.56 0.71 -0.15  0.60 0.78 -0.18 
Magnitude of Reduction (+6 to +10 minus +1) -0.82*    -0.85**    -1.27* 
   (3.15)    (2.36)    (2.58) 
 
 
41 
 
Table 4. Price impact asymmetry: price run-up and information variables 
Permanent price impact NPPIt+1 and asymmetry variables retain their definition from previous tables. We 
present the information for high and low information asymmetry groups based on four different information 
variables - stock idiosyncratic volatilities in Panel A, analyst forecast dispersion in Panel B, trading intensity in 
Panel C, and price dispersion in Panel D. Within each panel, we form high and low portfolios using the 4th and 
1st quartiles as cut-off points. We calculate t-statistics using standard errors adjusted with the Newey-West 
(1987) procedure and presented in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
The number of stock-day observations is 2,416,369. 
Price Run-up High (4
th quartile)   Low (1st quartile) 
Buy Sell Asymmetry   Buy Sell Asymmetry 
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Volatility   
1 1.22 0.33 0.90*  0.70 0.38 0.32* 
        
+2 to +5  1.27 0.71 0.56  0.77 0.33 0.43* 
        
+6 to +10  0.44 1.15 -0.71  0.67 0.48 0.19 
        
Magnitude of Reduction (+6 to +10 minus +1) -1.60*    -0.13 
   (3.49)    (0.63) 
Panel B: Analyst Forecast Dispersion   
1 1.51 0.37 1.14*  0.62 0.29 0.33* 
        
+2 to +5  1.44 0.68 0.75*  0.67 0.27 0.40* 
        
+6 to +10  0.75 1.17 -0.43**  0.50 0.95 -0.45 
        
Magnitude of Reduction (+6 to +10 minus +1) -1.57*    -0.78* 
   (6.25)    (2.93) 
Panel C: Trading Intensity      
1 1.40 0.68 0.72*  0.54 0.29 0.25* 
        
+2 to +5  1.30 0.49 0.80*  0.38 0.22 0.16** 
        
+6 to +10  0.80 0.89 -0.09  0.36 0.28 0.08 
        
Magnitude of Reduction (+6 to +10 minus +1) -0.80*    -0.17 
   (3.32)    (0.79) 
Panel D: Price Dispersion    
1 1.81 0.18 1.63*  0.39 0.39 -0.00 
        
+2 to +5  1.57 0.68 0.89*  0.56 0.22 0.34* 
        
+6 to +10  0.33 0.74 -0.41*  0.38 0.47 -0.08 
        
Magnitude of Reduction (+6 to +10 minus +1) -2.04*    -0.08 
   (4.27)    (0.20) 
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Table 5. Price impact asymmetry: market condition 
NIT adjusted permanent price impact PPIt+1 (NPPI) and asymmetry variables retain their definition from 
previous tables. We present the information for bull and bear markets, where we define a bull market as months 
when the CRSP value-weighted index provided positive returns and the bear market is when the CRSP value-
weighted index had negative monthly returns. We calculate t-statistics using standard errors adjusted with the 
Newey-West (1987) procedure and presented in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels 
respectively. The number of stock-day observations is 2,416,369. 
 
Price Run-up 
Bull    Bear 
Buy Sell Asymmetry   Buy Sell Asymmetry 
  
1 0.97 0.16 0.81* 
 
0.82 0.55 0.26** 
        
+2 to +5  0.99 0.26 0.73*  0.74 0.69 0.04 
        
+6 to +10  0.49 1.01 -0.52**  0.43 0.91 -0.48** 
        
Magnitude of Reduction (+6 to 
+10 minus +1)   -1.33*    -0.74* 
   (5.58)    (3.03) 
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Table 6. Regression results  
The table shows the regression results where the dependent variable is NPPI defined as Raw Permanent 
Price Impact minus the NIT (No Institutional Trade) price change for matching number of price run-up 
stock-days; t+n denotes the Permanent Price Impact after n days. We use Market condition, which is the 
one-month value weighted CRSP return, Firm Size (log of market capitalization) and the inverse of stock 
price as control variables. Statistical significance is indicated by * for 1% levels, ** for 5% levels and 
*** for 10% levels. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 NPPI t+1 NPPI t+1 NPPI t+1 NPPI t+5 NPPI t+10 
      
Intercept 0.252* 0.287* -0.069 -0.012 -0.198*** 
      
Buy dummy 0.711* 0.621* 0.232* 0.404* 0.671* 
      
Price History 0.069** 0.067* 0.041* 0.046* 0.051* 
      
Buy dummy x Price History -0.110** -0.109** -0.091* -0.092* -0.111* 
      
      
      
Analyst Dispersion  0.039** 0.099** 0.068** 0.076*** 
      
Buy Dummy x Analyst 
Dispersion 
 0.095* 0.089* 0.093 0.079 
      
Buy dummy x Price History x 
Analyst Dispersion  
 -0.014 -0.004* -0.092* -0.009 
      
Firm Size   -0.007 -0.003 0.004 
      
Market Condition   0.065* 0.009* 0.015* 
      
Inverse of Stock Price   -0.017* -0.019* -0.018* 
      
      
N 2,412,220 
 
2,412,220 
 
2,412,220 
 
2,412,220 
 
2,412,220 
 
Adj. R2 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 
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Table 7. Price impact asymmetry on abnormal volume days  
The table shows permanent price impact asymmetry for abnormal volume event days. NPPI and Price 
History retain their definition from previous tables. In Panel A, we compute abnormal volume stock-
day events based on trades from our sample.  If the absolute net trade volume in a stock exceeds its 
average trading volume in the last 60 trading days, we classify the stock-day as an abnormal volume 
event. We have 1.4 million such events. In Panel B, we identify abnormal volume event day based on 
CRSP volume.  We classify stock-days on which stocks traded (by the entire market) more than the 
average of the last 60 trading days as abnormal volume event days. We have 0.97 million such events. 
*,** indicate significance of 1% and 5% and we calculate T-statistics using standard errors adjusted 
with the Newey-West (1987) procedure and presented in parentheses. 
Price 
History 
NPPI t+1 NPPI t+5 NPPI t+10 
Buy Sell Asymmetry Buy Sell Asymmetry Buy Sell Asymmetry 
Panel A:           
1 0.95 0.33 0.62* 0.97 0.25 0.73* 1.11 0.17 0.95* 
+2 to +5  0.93 0.45 0.48* 0.99 0.16 0.83* 1.14 0.03 1.11* 
+6 to +10  0.50 0.57 -0.07 0.56 0.54 0.02 0.46 0.78 -0.32 
Magnitude of Reduction 
(+6 to +10 minus +1) -0.69**   -0.71**   -1.27* 
t-stat 
  
(2.43) 
  
(2.00) 
  
(3.54) 
Panel B:          
1 1.28 0.26 1.03* 1.35 0.11 1.24* 1.61 0.15 1.46* 
+2 to +5  1.25 0.35 0.90* 1.34 0.21 1.13* 1.54 0.20 1.33* 
+6 to +10  0.55 0.52 0.03 0.56 0.34 0.22 0.66 0.66 0.00 
Magnitude of Reduction 
(+6 to +10 minus +1) -1.00*   -1.02**   -1.46** 
t-stat   (2.86)   (2.21)   (2.55) 
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Figure 1: Price impact asymmetry and price history 
In this figure, we plot NPPI defined as raw permanent price impact minus the NIT (no 
institutional trade) price change for matching number of price run-up stock-days. We plot 
NPPI for institutional buy imbalances, institutional sell imbalances, and the asymmetry 
between buy and sell imbalances on the vertical axis. Price impact asymmetry is the 
difference between NIT-adjusted buy and sell price impacts. Raw price impact is 
calculated as the stock return from one day before the order arrival to one day after the 
last trade in that order. Price history on the horizontal axis ranges from 1 day of price run-
up to +10 days of consecutive price run-ups.  
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